Abstract-Using a new database of islands throughout the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans we find a robust positive relationship between the number of years spent as a European colony and current GDP per capita. We argue that the nature of discovery and colonization of islands provides random variation in the length and type of colonial experience. We instrument for length of colonization using variation in prevailing wind patterns. We argue that wind speed and direction had a significant effect on historical colonial rule but do not have a direct effect on GDP today. The data also suggest that years as a colony after 1700 are more beneficial than earlier years. We also find a discernable pecking order among the colonial powers, with years under U.S., British, French, and Dutch rule having more beneficial effects than Spanish or Portuguese rule. Our finding of a strong connection between modern income and years of colonization is conditional on being colonized at all since each of the islands in our data set spent some time under colonial rule.
I. Introduction
U nderstanding the variation in income across countries remains one of the most important research questions in economics. This paper examines one potentially major cause of long-term income differences between countriesvariation in the nature and length of colonization by Europeans. We use a new data set of islands in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian oceans that were colonized during the Age of Discovery. The main advantage of our new data set is random variation in the colonial experience. We argue that the finding and colonizing of the islands in our data set has a large random component and that the colonial experiences of our islands constitute a natural experiment. We test this conjecture by using wind patterns as an instrument. Wind was crucial during the Age of Discovery, but is not relevant to modern travel and therefore provides an ideal instrument for the colonial experience.
The central finding in our paper is that the length of colonial period is strongly positively related to modern outcomes. 1 In order to assess the randomness of the colonial experience (colonizers may settle the best places first and give them up last), we instrument for the year of European discovery and subsequent length of colonial period using data on wind patterns. The IV results are extremely similar to the OLS results, which is consistent with our assertion that much of the variation in the colonization of islands is random. Our finding is quite robust within our islands data set and we show it also holds within the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) set of continental countries. 2 We also find that the impact of colonial regimes varies by the identity of the colonizer and the timing of colonialism. Pre-Enlightenment colonization (that is, in the 1500s and 1600s) and colonization by Spain and Portugal are found to be less beneficial than later colonization.
We are hardly the first to examine the relationship between colonial rule and modern outcomes. Historians and political scientists have emphasized the long-term negative consequences of colonial rule, including the possible inability of former colonies to transition to a stable form of self-government or the possible negative effects of resource extraction. 3 Recent economic work on the importance of institutions has emphasized the colonial legacy. La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 show that former colonies of English common-law countries have more developed capital markets than former colonies with French civil law. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) look at the effect of differences in colonial property rights institutions in India. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) show that the form of colonization (extractive versus heavy settlement by Europeans) tended to determine the type of institutions created in the country and therefore strongly affected modern outcomes. Engerman and Sokoloff (2003, 2005) hypothesize that forms of colonialism that promoted severe inequality hampered the future growth prospects of a colony.
Obviously causality is problematic in considering the effect of institutions on income. The literature has attempted to deal with this reverse causality through the use of instrumental variables, but finding appropriate instruments is difficult. Mauro (1995) uses ethnolinguistic fractionalization to instrument for corruption. Hall and Jones (1999) use the distance from the equator as an instrument, arguing that this determines the degree of European influence. In neither case is it clear that the instrument does not have a direct effect on output. In a paper focusing on Indian states, Iyer (2005) uses the deaths of rulers lacking male heirs as an instrument for the degree of British colonial control. She finds that direct British control had a negative impact on modern outcomes. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) argue that the death rates of settlers provide a useful instrument for modern institutions. This approach has not been without critics. McArthur and Sachs (2000) argue that settler mortality is related to the overall disease environment and has a direct effect on output.
We bring two innovations to this debate. First, we have created a new database of 81 islands that contains a large number of additional data points beyond the usual cross section of countries used by growth economists. Of the 136 countries in the Penn World Tables with GDP data for 1989 only 13 are in our database. 4 Islands provide an interesting experiment in that our sample has more homogeneous initial conditions than the Penn World Tables group. Second, we argue that variation in the colonial experience of islands was relatively random and therefore constitutes a natural experiment.
We propose and implement a new source of exogenous variation in colonial history-wind patterns. Wind speed and direction were crucial during the Age of Sail, and have useful variation within each ocean and within given latitudes. Islands located near routes in the prevailing winds made useful stopovers and were more easily revisited and colonized. However, since the beginning of the Age of Steam over a hundred years ago, the importance of wind patterns has disappeared. We argue that any effect of wind speed on current GDP works only through wind's effect on European settlement.
II. The Random Component to Island Settlement and the Importance of Wind
The exploration and settlement of islands in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian oceans entails hundreds of fascinating stories and historical accidents. Most of the Caribbean islands were known to Europeans prior to most of the Pacific islands. This was a matter of distance from Europe and the incredible vastness of the Pacific. 5 Meanwhile, certain islands in the Pacific (in French Polynesia and the Cook Islands in particular) were not sighted by Europeans until the late 1700s. Patterns of settlement were determined in part by obvious economic factors like distance to the mainland. However, a fair amount of colonization was due to unique historical accidents and due to historical trade routes and wind patterns.
There are almost as many discovery stories as there are islands, particularly in the Pacific. The infamous case of the Mutiny on the Bounty led to the discovery and colonization of Rarotonga, Kadavu, Pitcairn, and Norfolk islands. 6 Penrhyn Island was accidentally colonized in 1788 when Captain Sever smashed his ship (the Penryhn) into the shoreline on his way to deliver convicts to Botany Bay. Palmerston was colonized by the British mostly because it was empty when Captain Cook discovered it. 7 Though random accident played a large role, we will also argue that wind speed and direction were important factors in the pattern of island colonization. Unlike powered boats, sailboats require steady wind to make headway. Islands located in areas where the wind is weak were less likely to be discovered, revisited, and colonized by Europeans. Wind direction is also important. The technology available at the time of the voyage of Columbus only allowed ships to sail about twenty degrees into the wind. This technology improved slowly over time, but sailing into the wind remained difficult until steamships became the norm in the twentieth century. 8 Consistent downwind routes between useful destinations were therefore well traveled while much of the globe went virtually untouched. Much of the east to west traffic across the Pacific after Magellan's 1521 crossing closely followed his pioneering voyage because his path was the logical and efficient way to cross. Crossing in the opposite direction turned out to be much more difficult due to prevailing wind patterns. 9 At least four Spanish expeditions attempted and failed to establish a west to east route across the Pacific in the wake of Magellan's voyage. It was not until 1565 that a west to east path was found across the Pacific, and this required sailing much farther north.
The net result of this history is that the pattern of colonization is related to the speed and direction of the prevailing winds. Islands like Fefan and Pohnpei in the Federated States of Micronesia have calm winds, were not located near the Spanish trade route, and were basically left alone, even after their discovery in the 1680s. At the other extreme, despite also being quite isolated, Guam was directly on the Spaniard's Manila Galleon route because of a favorable combination of wind and currents. Magellan found Guam in 1521, and by the end of the century it was settled as a watering hole for Spanish ships on the MexicoPhilippines route.
Once an island was discovered, the path to European settlement was made more difficult by the crude state of mapping technology. Before the mid-eighteenth century the measurement of longitude at sea was extremely imprecise. 4 Barbados, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Mauritius, Philippines, Seychelles, Trinidad and Tobago, Puerto Rico, Vanuatu.
5 For example, Columbus sighted the British Virgin Islands in 1493 and he had already sighted portions of the Bahamas, Hispaniola, and Cuba a year before that. Of the 39 Atlantic islands in our database, 24 were first sighted by Columbus during one of his three voyages. By 1685 the Dutch were using St. Thomas (Virgin Islands) as a slave trading post, and the island contained large sugar plantations by the mid-1700s. 6 While fleeing Tahiti, the mutineers discovered Rarotonga in the Cook Islands. Captain Bligh discovered Kadavu in Fiji as he sailed his open boat 3,600 miles from the Friendly Islands to Java (without losing a single one of his eighteen crewmembers). The mutineers settled on Pitcairn (with their Tahitian wives) precisely because no one lived there and it was not near any land mass of note. The mutineers' descendants became so numerous that the British government then moved some of them to Norfolk Island, thereby creating a second new colony. 7 The first group of settlers took to murdering each other. However, the second settlement was more successful; William Marsters moved there in 1862 with his three Polynesian wives, and his descendants are still there.
8 Sailing ships were common for transoceanic voyages long after the introduction of steam-powered ships because it was difficult for early steamships to carry enough fuel for long voyages. This was particularly true in the Pacific. 9 At the middle latitudes where most of our sample is located the prevailing winds are to the west in both the Pacific and the Atlantic.
Sailors had to rely on dead reckoning to measure, which became less and less precise the farther the ship strayed from known landmarks. 10 There are many cases of islands appearing multiple times on early maps because longitude was estimated differently by separate voyages. Revisiting an island charted by a previous voyage was problematic. The known map of the world at the dawn of the eighteenth century was therefore incomplete and inaccurate. Such was the state of ignorance that many still held out hope of a large undiscovered land mass in the Pacific. 11 The main form of navigation was latitude sailing, which involved sailing directly west along the latitude line of a known landmark. 12 Utilizing this method of navigation, east-west corridors of consistent winds are crucial.
This history makes wind speed an ideal instrument for colonization and settlement. Wind was incredibly important during the Age of Sail, but its importance came to an abrupt halt early in the twentieth century. Within our sample, wind speed should not have a direct effect on an island's current level of GDP, but could have an important effect via the island's history of colonization. The vast majority of our sample is in the westerly trade winds. In a first-stage regression, the average speed and variability of the westerly winds are significant determinants of the number of years of colonization.
III. The Nature of Island Colonization
In the Atlantic islands, colonization generally consisted of several hundred or a few thousand Europeans arriving and in some cases being granted large parcels of land for farming. Early Spanish colonialism was governed by the encomienda system, which essentially introduced feudal institutions to the colonies. The conquistadores were given trusteeship over the native peoples. In practice, natives (mostly Arawaks or Caribs) were often enslaved to work on these plantations.
The English and French were more enterprising than the Spaniards in setting up the sugar-slave economy and by 1673 there were 57 plantations in English-controlled Barbados. Jamaica was at one point in the seventeenth century (after the British captured it from the Spaniards) the world's largest producer of sugar (Black, 1965) . By 1700, the French had established many sugar plantations on virtually all of their islands, including Martinique, Guadeloupe, Grenada, St. Croix, and Saint-Domingue (present-day Haiti) .
Colonies in the Pacific islands tended to involve fewer numbers of Europeans and far less reliance on imported slaves. Missionaries were often the first colonial residents. For example, Guam was first sighted by Magellan in 1521. In 1668 the Spanish installed a group of Jesuit missionaries, a single garrison of soldiers, and a colonial governor. The Spanish mission totaled fifty people relative to the 12,000 Chamorros on Guam (Douglas & Douglas, 1994; Rogers, 1995) .
The Immediate Impact of Colonization: Loss of Native Peoples to Disease and Slavery
One of the most striking and terrible facts about colonization by Europeans is the degree to which native populations on some islands were decimated either by brutal enslavement or by diseases carried by Europeans and their animals (see Diamond, 2005) . This is most true in the Atlantic where certain islands lost their entire native population in a short amount of time. 13 The Pacific islanders also faced shocking mortality due to smallpox and other diseases brought by the Europeans. 14 However, unlike in the Atlantic only a few of the Pacific islands saw a complete wiping out of the original inhabitants, and there are substantial native populations in the Pacific today. 15 Any discussion of the effects of colonialism on economic output has to acknowledge the devastation of native populations and cultures. Our results show that islands with a longer colonial history (and more settlement by Europeans) have higher income per capita and lower infant mortality than other similar islands. Is it sensible to measure the positive effects on growth from European contact if in fact the original inhabitants are partially or entirely wiped out 10 Magellan's voyage was predicated on the hope that the Spice Islands were on the Spanish side of the line described by the Treaty of Tordesillas. This uncertainty was made possible because the precise longitude of the islands was uncertain at the time.
11 This changed during the latter half of the eighteenth century with the solution of the longitude problem by Harrison. James Cook and others made voyages that filled in the remaining map of the Pacific.
12 Latitude sailing was the most common form of navigation before the solution to the longitude problem. Suppose you were trying to sail from Europe to a particular island in the Pacific without an accurate measure of longitude. You would head north after rounding Cape Horn until the vessel was at the same latitude as the destination. This was easy and effective because the ship's latitude could be easily and accurately determined by measuring the height of the sun off the horizon at noon. Similarly, the latitude of your destination on charts was well measured even if the longitude was not. Once at the proper latitude, all that was needed to get to the destination was to sail due west until you arrived. In order for this strategy to work, it was important that you arrived at the target latitude to the east of your destination, forcing ships to sail north more rapidly than would be sensible on a direct route. With this style of navigation, east-west corridors with steady winds become more frequently traveled. 13 For example, the Spaniards began to colonize Puerto Rico in 1505 under the leadership of Ponce de Leon. The native Tainos were enslaved as part of the encomienda system in which land grants to Spaniards included the right to extract tribute or labor from the natives assigned to that land. The original population of Tainos was estimated to have been 60,000. By 1515 this had fallen to 14,400 and by 1530 to 1,500 (Wagenheim, 1998) . Prior to the arrival of Europeans, Jamaica was heavily settled and was home to tens of thousands of Arawaks. Not a single one of the natives were alive by the time the British took over from the Spanish in 1655 (Black, 1965) .
14 Venereal disease brought by the Spaniards often led to sterilization. 15 Perhaps the worst depopulation occurred in Guam and the Marianas. The number of pure-blooded Chamorros on Guam fell from 12,000 in 1668 to 1,576 in 1742 (Rogers, 1995) . The Tahitians saw a drop in their population as a result of the introduction of European disease, but this was followed by a partial recovery. One estimate puts the population of Tahiti at 24,000 around the time of Cook's visit but only 9,000-10,000 by 1800. The native population stabilized and remained around 9,500 at the time of the 1848 census (Newbury, 1980) . because of that contact? Is the possibility of no European contact a realistic counterfactual? Even without colonialism proper, any contact still may have wiped out entire populations.
We do not intend to address these questions in this paper. Our results are simply an examination of the standard of living of people currently alive on these islands relative to the colonial experience. We do, however, recognize that there are other measures of the outcomes from colonialism that may generate different conclusions. It is certainly plausible to argue that the accumulated utility of Pacific islanders since first encountering Europeans is lower than in the counterfactual even if the current standard of living on these islands is significantly higher because of that contact.
IV. The Long-Run Impact of Colonialism on Income
The central finding of our paper is that there is a robust positive relationship between colonial tenure and modern outcomes. The obvious question is why? More intensive involvement with Europeans or longer colonial rule might have left islands with a more stable or better structured government. This theory is most associated with Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) . Unfortunately, it is not easy to identify which governmental institutions are the most critical, and measuring institutional quality is extremely difficult. Furthermore, even if we had a modern index of say, expropriation risk or corruption for these islands, one might worry that good modern institutions were caused by high incomes rather than the other way around. We offer two partial (and admittedly imperfect) solutions to this conundrum.
In order to examine whether the quality of governmental institutions matters we look at variation in both who did the colonizing and when colonialism occurred. The work of La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 suggests that the identity of the colonizing country has important effects on modern income through the legal system. The historical record also suggests that different countries varied in the manner in which they ruled their holdings. The encomienda system of the Spanish may have had different effects than French or British rule.
We also think that the timing of colonialism (holding colonizer constant) may be related to institutional quality, with the later period representing both better governmental institutions and better intentions on the part of colonizers. There was a distinct change in the attitude of the explorers toward the world between the beginning of the period of exploration and the final filling in of the map of the world. A simple illustration of this point can be seen in the differences between the voyages of Ferdinand Magellan and James Cook.
When Magellan set sail on his famous circumnavigation in 1519 his goal was to find a Spanish route to the Spice Islands. The Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 split the world between Spain and Portugal at 46°W longitude. The Spanish felt that a westward route would allow them to lay claims on the Spice Islands. The agreement between Spain and Portugal had the blessing of the Pope, and along with their rights to these unfound lands came a responsibility to spread Christianity. Magellan's voyage was therefore explicitly commercial with religious overtones.
This stands in stark contrast to the voyages of James Cook between 1768 and 1779. Cook's missions had explicit scientific aims. On all three voyages, Cook brought artists and scientists to record and study all that he found. Unlike Magellan, who was driven to bring Christianity to the natives, Cook had a much more romantic view of the Pacific islanders.
We debauch their morals already too prone to vice and we introduce among them wants and perhaps diseases which they never before knew and which serves only to disturb that happy tranquility they and their forefathers have enjoyed . . . If anyone denies the truth of this assertion let him tell me what the natives of the whole extent of America have gained by the commerce they have had with Europeans. 16 There is evidence that the more enlightened attitude of the later explorers is correlated with a more enlightened approach to administering colonies. Some of the Pacific islands were not colonized until the mid-nineteenth century (for example, Tahiti and the Marquesas). No enslavement of the natives took place there and representative local governments were set up within seventy years of colonization.
More generally, many of the institutional features considered to be important for modern outcomes were not well developed in European countries in the earlier period and therefore were not available for transfer. The primacy of parliaments, the importance of the rule of law, and the protection of property rights advanced significantly between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. To the extent that we find that later colonial years (for example, those after 1700) are more beneficial than earlier colonial years (such as those before 1700), we take this as another indicator that institutional quality partly explains the colonialism-income connection.
V. Data Description
The data on island colonization, GDP, and infant mortality are assembled from a large number of sources. Our starting point was a database of islands maintained by the UN. 17 This data set provided us with a comprehensive list of individual islands along with nation, population, and area. We sorted the islands by size and investigated islands that satisfied two criteria. First, we only included islands that require open ocean sailing to reach them from Europe. Second, we limited the sample to relatively small land-16 Hough (1994) . 17 http://islands.unep.ch/. masses, specifically those less than 150,000 square kilometers.
These selection criteria are intended to generate a sample of islands that fit our story of random variation in colonial experience. We are particularly interested in the randomness associated with the age of exploration. Islands that were unavoidably found as Europeans made their way down the coast of Africa clearly have a less random history than the islands of the Pacific. 18 The size criterion is intended to make the sample as homogeneous as possible. Large landmasses like Australia are fundamentally different than the islands in our sample. Within the group of islands fitting these criteria we researched islands in order of population using any islands for which data were available.
Islands that are part of a group are only included as independent data points if there is some independent information for the individual island. For example, the majority of the islands in the Maldives have an identical colonial history and we only have one GDP data point for the entire group. In this case, there is only one island in the Maldives included in our data set. On the other hand, the islands of the Netherlands Antilles have heterogeneity of both colonial history and GDP, so the individual islands in the group are included separately. We do, however, recognize that these may not be completely independent data points, so all the econometric analysis is clustered at the islands group level.
Where available, we obtained GDP per capita for the year 2000 from the United Nations. Per capita GDP figures were available for 39 island nations covering 61 of the islands in our data set. Twenty islands are possessions of other countries; for example, Guam is a U.S. possession. In those cases we obtained island-level income per capita and infant mortality numbers for the island from the statistical agency of the relevant country. 19 In the case of islands that are currently part of an island group (such as the Cook Islands), we disaggregated country-level data into the component islands where possible. For example, Yap and Pohnpei are both states in the Federated States of Micronesia, but the two islands have different histories, wind patterns, and economic output and are located more than 1,000 miles apart. In some of these cases we were able to obtain separate GDP breakdowns from a series of reports on Pacific island groups produced by the Asian Development Bank. 20 The colonial and settlement histories for each island come from a myriad of sources. For the Pacific islands we relied heavily on the Pacific Islands Yearbook (Douglas & Douglas, 1994) . For Atlantic and Indian Ocean islands, we used Encyclopedia Britannica and Wikipedia, and supplemented these sources with the individual island histories listed below in the references section. 21 We collected the entire history of each island, including the first European sightings, the first settlements, the extent of such settlements, and the political history of the island's colonization if any.
We define colonialism as those years during which an island is claimed politically by one of the European countries, the United States, or Japan. This requires not only that the colonizing country has landed on the island and claimed it, but that the central government of the European power has ratified a law stating that the island is one of its possessions. 22 We take any of the words territory, possession, protectorate, or colony to signify an island's status as a colony. Disputes of ownership were relatively short lived and in the case of a dispute we always code as the colonizing the country that power which maintained physical (such as military and administrative) control of the majority of the island's people.
Wind speeds measured in average knots are from satellite data taken from CERSAT. 23 The satellites measure wind speeds over water for the entire globe, reported on a onedegree longitude-latitude grid. The data we utilize are reported monthly and consist of the average wind vector in knots in the north-south direction and the average wind vector in the east-west direction. These two vectors completely describe the average wind speed and direction in a given month. Given monthly average observations on both vectors, we are able to look at the variability of the wind speed as well as the average intensity. Thus the most parsimonious set of instruments is the average of the raw monthly data and its standard deviation. In other words, we have the average annual wind speed to the north and its monthly variability, and the average annual wind speed to the east and its monthly variability.
Alternatively the raw data can be transformed into a set of compass directions and wind speeds. In a regression this requires using a set of four, eight, or sixteen compass point dummies and possibly interacting these dummies with the 18 The islands that make up Indonesia and Papua New Guinea are excluded for this reason: they were found and settled quite early and there was nothing random about this process. Our results are however robust to including these two countries as an additional two data points.
19 In these cases we will be using income per capita as a proxy for GDP per capita. We recognize that this is an imperfect measure. We report robustness checks where we limit ourselves to the GDP data. 20 We used the breakdowns by island in the following way: The island group level data was used to establish relative income levels. For example, the disaggregated data tells us that Yap in the FSM has twice the per capita income of Moen in the same group. Using the relative income and population data we calculated the per capita income for each island so that the relative income levels were correct and that the population weighted group average was equal to the GDP per capita figure for the group from the UN. 21 Not all of the references are explicitly cited in the text since many of these references were used to establish colonial histories for individual islands. 22 We also coded New Zealand's ownership of Niue from 1904 to 1974 as colonial years. We did the same for Australia's ownership of Nauru during 1914-1968. We did this following a referee's suggestion, and it makes sense given that New Zealand and Australia were highly developed "neo-Europes" by the twentieth century. wind speed. We have also tried specifying our instrument in this form and we obtain similar results.
Given the direction of travel from Europe, the east-west component of the wind should be particularly important for sailing voyages, and our first-stage regressions confirm this. But we report results using a variety of combinations of the instruments. Table 1 contains summary statistics for the data. Forty of the 81 islands are located in the Pacific. Thirty-five are in the Atlantic and the remaining islands are in the Indian Ocean. The median population on our islands is about 14,000 people. This ranges from as few as 102 people on Palmerston Island (in the Cook Islands) to more than 11 million people in Cuba. Our results are robust to dropping islands with fewer than 10,000 people. The median land area for the islands is 130 square kilometers. The mean 2000 GDP per capita on the islands in the sample is $8,279, with a high of $53,735 for Bermuda.
The average number of centuries of colonization (using our political definition) is 2.32. But there are many islands with relatively limited colonial experience. Twenty-two countries in the sample were a colony for one hundred years or less, and eleven for less than fifteen years. In general the Atlantic islands were the first to be colonized by Europeans, and some islands including Bonaire, Curacao, and Barbados have four hundred years of colonial history.
One possible criticism of our approach is that islands tend to be small and have different natural resources than continental nations and are therefore not "real countries" of interest to macroeconomists. Since many successful islands focus on tourism, one could also make the case that this also makes them different from "real" countries. We have several responses to this. First, the islands in the sample have significant variation in levels of income and industry mix. Appendix table A5 shows that agriculture is a large fraction of the economy for islands like Dominica and some of the Federated States of Micronesia like Pohnpei. Bermuda and the Virgin Islands tend to focus on services, though this can mean banking and insurance in addition to tourism. More importantly, even if all the islands in the South Pacific or the Atlantic had beautiful beaches, we still would need to ask why certain islands have a subsistence level of income while others have a standard of living that rivals Sweden and the United States. Grand Cayman is a tourist paradise, while Hispaniola (Haiti plus the Dominican Republic) is not, despite the fact that both islands have tropical breezes and the beauty of the Caribbean Sea. 24 Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of log GDP per capita versus number of centuries as a colony. The circles are for islands in the Atlantic. The triangles are for islands in the Pacific and the squares are for islands in the Indian Ocean. The regression line shows a positive relationship between length of colonial period and modern GDP. While there is a large amount of variation around the regression line (we certainly don't think colonial history explains everything), the tstatistic for the slope is 6.1. The coefficient is 0.42, meaning that every additional hundred years of colonial history is associated with a 42% increase in GDP. Remarkably, the upward slope holds within each of the oceans. The relation- 24 We are not claiming that the length and nature of the colonial period explains the Grand Cayman-Hispaniola income gap specifically, but rather that even within Caribbean islands, there is massive and interesting variation in economic performance. 
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ship is not driven simply by the fact that Atlantic islands were discovered by Europeans earliest and are the richest. Table 2 shows nine different cross-sectional regressions with our basic result. For columns 1 through 7 log GDP per capita is the dependent variable. Column 1 shows the basic correlation illustrated in figure 1. A longer period under colonial rule is associated with higher per capita GDP. Each additional hundred years is associated with GDP per capita that is 42% higher.
Column 2 adds additional controls. We include dummies for each ocean and we control for island land area and absolute value of latitude (distance from the equator). As in Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) and Sachs (2003) , the absolute value of latitude is strongly related to current levels We regress Log GDP per capita and infant mortality on the number of years the island spent as a colony of a European power. Columns 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8 are OLS. Columns 3, 5, 7, and 9 are two-stage least squares where we instrument for centuries of colonial rule or the first year as a colony using the twelve-month average and standard deviation of the east-west wind speed for each island. In the IV columns, we do not instrument for final year a colony or "remained a colony" in 2000. We obtain similar IV results when we use LIML rather than two-stage least squares.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. We cluster at the island group level since several of the islands (such as the Cook Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia) are used as separate observations from a cluster of politically related yet geographically distinct islands. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
of income. Every ten-degree increase in latitude (in other words, moving roughly seven hundred miles away from the equator) is associated with a 53% increase in GDP. Those authors find that latitude works through the efficiency of agriculture and disease prevalence. Acemoglu et al. (2001) provide evidence that latitude's effects work through variation in the nature of European settlements and institutions that were established. Island area is also significant, with larger islands doing more poorly than smaller islands. Interestingly, the Pacific and Atlantic Ocean dummies are not significantly different from each other. Including the geographic controls does not substantially alter the results for colonial tenure. One important possibility is that Europeans simply chose to settle the best islands first and hence the more successful islands have a longer colonial history. In column 3 we instrument for the number of years as a colony using data on prevailing wind patterns. As discussed in a previous section, wind patterns make an appealing instrument because they were incredibly important during 1500-1890 (and determined discovery and settlement), but have little direct effect on GDP today.
Column 3 of table 2 shows the second stage of the two-stage least squares regression. The results are similar to the OLS results and the coefficient on years of colonization remains very significantly away from 0 with a t-statistic of 2.8. Each additional hundred years of colonization is associated with 71% larger GDP per capita. Utilizing a Hausman test, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the OLS and IV results are the same.
The first stage for this regression is contained in appendix table A1 column 1, which uses our preferred set of instruments. We use the east-west vector of wind and its standard deviation. Both instruments are significant predictors of centuries of colonialism. As expected, stronger westerly winds are associated with more years as a colony. This is illustrated graphically in figure 2. A larger standard deviation is also associated with more years as a colony. Appendix table A2 shows the possible first stages from various combinations of our raw wind data. In all cases the average east-west component is a significant predictor of years as a colony. The variability of the east-west vector adds a modest amount of explanatory power. The northsouth components do not seem to matter very much. All combinations of instruments are significant at the 5% level. However, the instrument sets using only east-west information are significant at the 1% level. For this reason all our standard results use the east-west wind speed and standard deviations as instruments. Appendix table A3 shows the second-stage results for each of the instrument sets. The results are insensitive to the particular combination used. First stages and reduced forms for all of the IV regressions in table 2 are included in appendix table A1.
One objection to our IV strategy is that the instrument is well suited to describing the beginning of colonial rule, but is not a good instrument for the end of colonial rule. In columns 4 and 5 of table 2 we switch our key right-handside variable to the first year that an island fell under colonial rule. 25 For this specification, we do not include any regressors describing the end date of colonial rule. Our IV strategy assumes that the instruments affect the beginning of colonial rule through the ability to reach each island during the Age of Sail. The end dates of colonial rule all fall well 25 The first and last years of colonization are divided by 100 to make the coefficients compatible with the centuries of colonial rule coefficients. 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
after the beginning of the Age of Steam, so our instrument should not have a direct effect on colonial end date. The results are extremely similar to the length of colonial rule results. Again a Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis that the IV and OLS coefficients are identical.
We also run regressions where we control explicitly for the end date of colonialism in columns 6 and 7 in table 2. We also add a dummy for islands that currently have a colonial relationship with a developed country (such as Puerto Rico, Guam, or the Netherlands Antilles). It is possible that current transfers from the colonizing country to these islands are important. 26 Interpretation of these additional controls is difficult since the end point of colonial rule is endogenous. We include these regressions largely to show that these channels appear to only explain a modest portion of our results. Only the initial date of colonialism is instrumented in column 7.
The results in columns 6 and 7 indicate that it is the start date of colonialism that is driving our results, not the end date. The coefficients on the beginning year of colonialism are similar in magnitude (though as expected, opposite in sign) to the coefficients in the previous regressions. The coefficient on the last year of colonialism is not statistically significant. Whether the island was still a colony in 2000, however, is significant and positive. Being a colony in 2000 is associated with 80%-95% higher income. The inclusion of this dummy has no significant impact on the coefficient on the first or last year of colonialism, suggesting that our base result is not being driven by current transfers, but that transfers may be incredibly beneficial for a modern island colony's income. 27 As an additional outcome measure we use infant mortality as the dependent variable in columns 8 and 9. These results mirror the results for GDP per capita. The number of centuries that an island was a colony is a negative and significant predictor of infant mortality in all the specifications. This result is also robust to our IV strategy.
The regressions in table 3 examine whether our results are being driven by sample and data selection. Column 1 repeats our base result. Column 2 excludes islands for which there is no direct GDP data available from the UN. These excluded islands are generally territories of developed countries such Guam and the British Virgin Islands. This column does allow for adjustments to GDP within island groups as described in the data section. Column 3 does not include these adjustments. The results for these three columns are similar, suggesting that our particular sample choices are not driving the results.
Columns 4 through 7 show the results of running our base regression on subsamples of islands limited to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Columns 4 and 5 are estimated with OLS. Columns 6 and 7 instrument the number of centuries 26 Our preferred specification excludes these controls for the end of colonialism since the end or continuation of colonialism is endogenous and a continuing colonial relationship may be an important part of the overall causal effect of being colonized early. 27 Including a late colonialism dummy alone in any of the earlier columns does not significantly affect the central results. Column 1 is the base sample used in the rest of the paper. Column 2 uses only GDP figures obtained from the UN, but includes disaggregation of islands that are part of a group. Column 3 uses only the raw UN GDP data. Columns 4 and 5 limit the sample to the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Columns 6 and 7 are two-stage least squares for each ocean where we instrument for centuries of colonial rule using the twelve month average and standard deviation of the east-west wind vector for each island. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the island group level. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
of colonialism with wind data as described above. The results are fairly similar within each ocean. In the Pacific, where we have the most variation in years of colonization, the coefficient on the number of years of colonialism is statistically significant. 28
A. Timing and Identity of Colonizing Powers
In table 4 we split out the effects of centuries of colonialism by the identity of the colonizer. The omitted category is years spent not as a colony. We wish to examine whether the effects differ across the colonizers. Of course, identification in these regressions is less clear than in the regressions identifying the number of years as a colony; we are not claiming that these regressions are necessarily causal. However, given the previous literature on differences in colonizers we feel that the correlations are interesting. In addition, our earlier results suggest a large degree of randomness in the colonial experiences of islands. If true, the OLS results are informative.
For the OLS results, the coefficients on centuries of British, French, and Dutch rule are all in the 0.5 to 0.6 range and are statistically indistinguishable. However, centuries of Spanish rule have a statistically significantly lower coefficient (at 0.20), and the Portuguese coefficient is significantly negative. We find this to be quite consistent with the hypothesis that colonialism's effects on income work through institutional quality. The Spanish and Portuguese legacy may still affect GDP per capita today (Landes, 1998) .
The positive coefficient on centuries of U.S. rule is very large. This is not surprising given the direct benefits to Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern Marianas, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Hawaii of current U.S. ownership and of the ability of these islanders to migrate to the mainland United States. The U.S. federal government has invested heavily in these places in infrastructure, schools, and healthcare systems. Columns 1, 2, and 5 are OLS. Years under British, French, and German legal systems are constructed by categorizing the colonizers legal system using the definitions in LaPorta et al. (1997) . Columns 3, 4, and 6 are instrumental variables regressions in which the instruments are the interactions between dummies for having ever been colonized by the United States, Dutch, British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Germans, or Japanese interacted with easterly wind speed and standard deviation of easterly wind. We interact the eight country dummies with each of the two wind variables. Column 3 includes the eight country dummies in the OLS regression. Column 4 includes the eight dummies in the first and second stages of the IV regression.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the island group level. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
In column 2 we add dummies for having ever been colonized by each of the eight colonial powers. In other words, we allow for the possibility that the sets of islands ruled by each power may be fundamentally different or that there may be different level effects transmitted by each colonizer irrespective of length of colonial period. The results in column 2 are qualitatively similar to those in column 1, which does not control for the set of colonial power dummies. For instance, the slope on centuries U.S. is still quite large though no longer statistically significant. This makes sense given that there is only modest variation in years of U.S. rule once we condition on having ever been a U.S. colony. The coefficients on years of British, French, and Spanish rule remain about the same, though the coefficient on Spanish rule loses statistical significance.
Columns 3 and 4 repeat this exercise using IV. The instruments for each country are the east-west speed and standard deviations interacted with a set of country dummies. This leaves us with two instruments for each country measurement. Since our IV strategy is only valid for determining the number of years as a colony, the results are somewhat difficult to interpret. Intuitively, our instruments are allowing wind speed to have different effects for each of the colonizers in the first stage. Given the limited sample size this leads to relatively weak first-stage regressions. The results are not significantly away from OLS, but in many cases this is due to much larger standard errors. In column 3 the relative weakness of years of Portuguese rule and the relative strength of years of Dutch rule remains significant. This significance disappears in column 4 once we add to the second stage the dummies for "ever colonized" by each of the eight colonial powers.
In column 3 we ask whether we can detect any difference in incomes among islands that use the British versus French legal system, and the answer is no. Incomes in the two types of islands look quite similar. Table 5 examines the timing of the colonial experience. Again, this set of regressions is not as well identified as our central result. We feel that the early colonial experience was significantly random and therefore the pre-1700 and post-1700 results are potentially causal. On the other hand, it is clear that the end of colonialism is potentially endogenous. For this reason, the twentieth-century results should be viewed with caution.
The differences in the effects of pre-and post-Enlightenment colonialism are evident in our data. Column 1 splits the number of years of colonialism into years before 1700 and years after 1700. 29 The results suggest that only the years after 1700 are positively associated with modern outcomes. An additional hundred years of post-1700 colonialism is associated with much higher per capita income (though this includes the very rich places that are still colonies). The coefficient is highly significant and significantly different from the coefficient on pre-1700 colonial years. This suggests that the colonial era of Cook was indeed different from that of Columbus and Magellan. Column 2 instruments the pre-and post-1700 colonialism years with the east-west and north-south wind vectors and their standard deviations. The results are very similar, with pre-and post-1700 years being significantly different. 30 29 The results are robust to moving the cutoff to 1750. 30 In the first stage regressions (not reported) the p-values on the F-statistics for the joint significance of the instruments are 0.03 and 0.025. Columns 1, 3, and 4 are OLS. Column 2 instruments for centuries a colony before and after 1700 using the east and north vectors of wind and their standard deviations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the island group level. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Column 3 breaks the years into three eras: pre-Enlightenment, post-Enlightenment, and post-1900. Once again, the pre-and post-Enlightenment years are significantly different from each other. The twentieth-century years are significantly better than either earlier era. In Column 4 we add a dummy for whether an island was a colony in 2000 in order to isolate the effect of transfers from other mechanisms. With this additional control, years of twentieth-century colonialism become statistically worse than years between 1700 and 1900. This shows that the positive twentieth-century result of column 3 is entirely driven by islands that remained colonies at the end of the century. Being a colony at the end of the twentieth century remains very positively associated with income. Conditional on making it to the end of the century as a colony, years as a colony in the twentieth century are negatively associated with income.
B. A Broader Sample of Countries
Our results suggest that the length of colonial experience is positively correlated with per capita GDP in a sample of islands. The IV results further suggest that these results are not being driven by the selective colonization of islands that have features conducive to good modern outcomes. Given the similarity of the IV and OLS results, it may be instructive to check the basic results against a larger, more traditional sample of countries. Table 6 shows the results from regressing per capita GDP against the number of years a country was a colony for a sample of non-island developing countries. This sample is consistent with the countries included in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) .
The basic results match quite nicely with our island results. Each additional century of colonial tenure is associated with a 40% increase in GDP. This is not statistically significantly different from the 42% coefficient found in the island sample. Including latitude as a control does not significantly change this coefficient. One advantage of using this sample is that standard measures of modern institutional quality can be included. Column 3 of table 6 includes expropriation risk as an additional regressor. Expropriation risk is significant and negative, as expected. This reduces the point estimate on colonial tenure, but it remains large and significant. In column 4 we include the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) measure of log settler mortality with similar results.
While the results from this sample are not as well identified as from the islands sample, they are still instructive.
The basic correlation appears to extend beyond our island sample. The results are robust to the inclusion of standard modern institutional measures and geographic controls.
VII. Concluding Remarks
We have argued for an "islands as experiments" approach where random variation in the colonial experiences of islands can be used to think about the long-run effects of colonial history on economic performance. The most interesting fact in our sample of island colonies is a robust positive relationship between the years of European colonialism and current levels of income. While some of this relationship could be driven by smart selection of islands by colonizers, we suspect that part of the relationship is causal. When we instrument for colonization and settlement using wind patterns, we obtain coefficients on years of colonization that are identical to our OLS results.
While the basic results suggest that longer European colonial exposure is good for the modern inhabitants of the islands in our sample, we also bring additional facts to bear to think about why. First, quality differences in the colonial experience seem to matter. These findings are consistent with the Acemoglu et al. (2001) result that the quality of the colonial experience is important for modern outcomes. There is a discernable pecking order among the colonizers. Years under U.S. and Dutch colonial rule are significantly better than years under the Spanish and Portuguese.
Second, later years of colonialism are associated with a much larger increase in modern GDP than years before 1700. It is not difficult to believe that colonialism in the postEnlightenment era led to more efficient and beneficial institution transfer than colonialism under the encomienda system We started with the Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson (2001) database and added our own measure of length of colonial period. We dropped the three island countries that were in AJR and our islands database. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
and its contemporaries. This is not to say that we find the early colonial years to be detrimental to modern GDP-we do not. While any attempt to get at root causes of the paper's central fact are partly speculative, we hope that the basic facts and data generated by this examination of islands will further the understanding of long-run growth. Columns 1, 3, and 5 are the first-stage regressions corresponding to columns 3, 5, and 7 in table 2. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 7 are the reduced forms for columns 3, 5, 7, and 9 in table 2. columns are for the instruments alone. We obtain similar IV results when we use LIML rather than two-stage least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the island group level. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. These are the first-stage regressions for various combinations of the raw wind data. A positive number for wind blowing on the east (north) vector is blowing toward the east (north). *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
